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Abstract 
 This paper examines the internal constraints on Gaza‟s manufacturing sector 
during the Israeli occupation. Manufacturing development was constrained by the Israeli 
occupation, but the authors chose to look at the situation from Gaza‟s point of view, and 
examine the attitudes and the effects of the lack of industrial experience on 
manufacturing. 
Internal constraints include the „lack of an adequate skills base‟, „a misunderstanding 
and distrust of marketing‟, „unsophisticated attitudes towards finance and the value of 
time‟, „price being seen as more important than quality‟ and „authoritarian attitudes to 
management practice‟. Local education and training are struggling to remedy aspects of 
this situation but they presently lack the resources.  
There was a widespread lack of understanding of the concept of a company as a separate 
entity.  
______________________________________________________________________ 
1. Introduction 
We write against the backdrop of a country struggling to turn away from violence and 
nervous about the future. Solutions to the problems facing Gaza in any attempt to build 
her industrial base requires a partnership between the public institutions and private 
initiative. Currently, economic autonomy in Gaza is very limited, Palestine is not yet a 
state and Gaza is not a country so there is little sovereignty over their politico-economic 
situation. The Palestinian National Authority (PNA) is very much concerned with the 
political agenda, economic planning in the face of an uncertain future can do little more 
than deal with day-to-day issues. Regulations by the Israeli authorities imply that they 
know the way in which the private industries should develop, but  the ways the public 
authorities have chosen to act are not the ways which the private companies would have 
chosen if the regulatory body had not intervened.   
The characteristics of manufacturing industries in Gaza during the Israeli occupation 
(1967-1994) was very similar to the pre-1967 period. Despite an increase in the 
contribution of industry to Gaza‟s GDP during the period under review from 4.4 per 
cent in 1966 (Arkadie, 1977) to 11 per cent in 1992 (World Bank, 1993) and a 
considerable increase in the number of establishments from 769 (1966) to 1,711 in 
1992, (SAI, 1993), the manufacturing industry failed to expand beyond its traditional 
boundaries. In short, the expansion of the manufacturing sector was horizontal, based on 
the existing products and methods of production, (Roy, 1987). An industry dominated 
by small-scale establishments, mainly producing household consumer goods. In 1992, 
91 per cent of the manufacturing establishments were employing 10 persons or less 
(SAI, 1993). In addition, between 1980 and 1986 the average annual industrial 
productivity of Gaza was well below the figures for the West Bank and Israel, ($2,531, 
$3,191 and $14,016 respectively). Gaza‟s Industrial production was primarily focused 
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on clothing, wood products, food, textiles and metal products (Union of Industrialists- 
Gaza, 1993).  
The external constraints and regulations on Gaza‟s manufacturing industries during the 
Israeli occupation are reasonably well understood and Israeli policies in Gaza have 
significantly contributed to the underdevelopment of Gaza's manufacturing sector. There 
are however internal constraints facing Gaza‟s manufacturing sector and these 
constraints have also contributed to the lack of manufacturing development in Gaza 
during the period 1967-1994. While many will argue that the internal constraints pale 
before the scale of the external problems facing Gaza, they need to be addressed; the re-
growth of any economy is ultimately dependent on the will of the people to grasp the 
nettle and make inroads into the heart of the problems facing them. 
There are many different starting points to choose from, education, training, 
government help, incentives and so on. In this paper we examine the internal constraints 
of Gaza‟s manufacturing by looking at the local industrialists and entrepreneurs, their 
attitudes, level of experience in industrial production, marketing and management. To 
date there have been plenty of discussions, but no examination, of these factors and their 
impact on Gaza‟s manufacturing sector.  
The study employs both primary and secondary data collected in the following 
manner: 
1) Conducting interviews with local businessmen who own and manage factories 
employing 10+ persons in the four main cities in the Gaza Strip. In addition, interviews 
were conducted with university and ministerial personnel concerned with the economic 
development of the territory, in order to benefit from their experience, understanding 
and evaluation of the economic activities in the Gaza Strip. These interviews were 
conducted between 25
th
 September 1996 and the 5
th
 June  1997. 
2) Questionnaires were distributed covering 97 manufacturing establishments, of 
different sizes, carried out specifically for the research. The questionnaires were close 
ended. The were randomly distributed in March and April 1994. One of the critical 
problems the authors encountered during the fieldwork was securing a list of 
companies‟ names and addresses. This is because the manufacturing establishments 
have grown randomly and there is no town planning. In an attempt to secure names, 
addresses, sizes and types of the manufacturing establishments, targeted in the 
fieldwork, visits were devoted to the Union of Industrialists and the Palestinian 
Chamber of Commerce in the Gaza Strip. Unfortunately, they have scant idea of  
industrial activities in Gaza. (See the Appendix at the end of this paper for a summary of 
the basic data on the manufacturing establishments in the survey). 
3) It was the aim of the authors to use the Israeli statistics as an indicator only because 
of lack of reliability (Bevinisti, 1986). This source was used because of the absence of 
other sources of information. 
4) Personal Observations: One of the authors had the opportunity to observe and discuss 
with managers their firm‟s problems.  
For our starting point we have classified the internal constraints facing the 
manufacturing industries along the following lines, looking in particular at the problems 
due to : 
i)  the location of the manufacturing firm;  
ii)  the lack of skills in the labour force;  
iii) the problems surrounding the buying of raw materials for manufacturing;  
d) the financial problems;  
        e) the purchasing of machinery and equipment;  
        f) maintenance problems;  
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        g) Gaza‟s production quality;  
             h) marketing of Gaza‟s manufactures;  
 i) management practices in the Gaza Strip. 
 
2. The Location of the Manufacturing Firm 
If we take Hunter‟s (1983) view, then any investigation of a potential location should 
take into consideration six factors, 1) Obviously the size of the building or site needs to 
accommodate present requirements but in addition, it should have sufficient additional 
space for the forecasts of future growth; 2) Essentially, the infrastructure needs to be in 
place, otherwise, if the company is located on a virgin site, the company will have to pay 
a substantial sum to organise the provision of services; 3) The type of product influences 
the location of the establishment. For example, a chemical industry which may cause 
environmental problems needs to have a much wider understanding of the impact it may 
have on the surrounding area; 4) Machinery for production and materials handling may 
also have a large bearing on plant location; 5) The required labour force, this includes 
the availability of skills required both for immediate and future needs; and 6) The 
closeness to, and the availability of, the raw materials, and the distribution channels for 
the products.          
The field work in this study showed that in considering location, only 6.2 % of Gaza‟s 
manufacturing firms were based on their proximity to the market (see Table 1). 
The location of  41.2 % were based on the availability of amenities and services, and the 
majority, 52.6 %, were dictated by the availability of buildings. It would be easy for us 
to reflect on the other significant factors which should be considered when deciding on 
the establishment‟s location, but it appears that for many business people, making a 
rational choice does not come into the picture as opportunities are seized and then the 
attempt is to make the best of the situation. As a result, the site size of the majority of 
the manufacturing firms is not suitable for future growth (Moamer; Ismail; Rayes; 
Halabi: Interviews, 1997). In addition, many experts claim that the sizes of many of the 
establishments are not even suitable for present needs let alone future growth, 
(Interviews, 1997). During several field visits paid to various industrial establishments 
in Gaza, it was noticed that it was often the case that there was no formal office or quiet 
room for management. Negotiations and transactions with suppliers or buyers are done 
in the street or in a noisy environment, this is partly explained by the fact that 52.6% of 
the buildings were not built for the industries they housed. During interviews with 
managers in the town of Khan Younis, in the clothing and shoe manufacturing area, 
(Interviews, 1994) it was admitted by many that they had not been wise in choosing 
their establishments‟ present location. They complained that the skilled labourers they 
needed, existed in other cities e.g. the city of Gaza. This situation was noted by the 
Policy Research Incorporated report (1992) which pointed out that the main reason for 
plant location in the occupied territories was because of its nearness to one‟s residence 
and not because of it being an economically appropriate site. This problem is related to 
the fact that the majority of Gaza‟s manufacturing establishments (80.4%) had never 
conducted feasibility studies (Table 2).  As Ismail commented :  
„„Feasibility study‟ is a new term in Gaza. It was hardly used before 1985, 
therefore all the establishments before this date were established without any 
drawn up plans. In addition, most of the firms who did conduct feasibility 
studies after 1985 never actually used them as blueprints. They conducted the 
feasibility studies as an issue which they associated with prestige, or because 
they were forced to carry them out in order to get loans from aid agencies.‟  
                Ismail; Interview, 1997 
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 Several other examples were mentioned by experts (Interviews, 1997) to 
demonstrate the poor investment decisions made by Gaza‟s entrepreneurs due in part to 
lack of feasibility studies. For example, Ismail mentioned two cases: 1) A biscuit 
manufacturing plant established in the late 1980s, which used second hand machinery 
imported from Israel. According to Ismail, one day‟s production  was sufficient to cover 
Gaza‟s needs for 6 months. Consequently, the factory had to close down because the 
running costs, in particular labour and power, were too high for the limited market; and 
2) Another biscuit enterprise was established in the early 1990s, and while the building 
and machinery were of high standard, the working capital was too small for the business 
to operate.  
 In addition, Rayes (Interview, 1997) commented on the issue of planning and 
investment in Gaza by saying that, “most of the problems facing Gaza‟s manufacturing 
sector were attributed to the question as to whether the enterprise should exist or not,” 
because of the fierce competition, low product quality and limited market size. 
Poor location and inadequate market size are indications of lack of industrial 
experience. 
3. Skilled Labour Force 
 To the authors‟ knowledge, there are no official figures on the number of Gaza‟s 
skilled labour force. Nor indeed are there numbers for those who have attended training 
programmes in management, production, computing or design, all of which are crucial 
skills for domestic industries. What we do have is data on the years of schooling. For 
example, only 24% of Gaza‟s labour force (35,460 persons) had attended 14+ years of 
schooling in 1989 (Okasha, 1990). 
A recent survey conducted by Nofal (1997) on Gaza‟s wood products establishments 
revealed that about 77.5% of their labour force is either illiterate or nearly so, (the field 
work for this study was conducted at the end of 1996 on 30 establishments). Only 22.5% 
of the labour force in the manufacturing sector had attained secondary level of education 
or higher. 
A manager of  a plastic establishment emphasised the problem of shortage of skills:  
„Shortage of skilled labour is always a problem. We cannot compete with 
the job opportunities inside Israel, because the wages there are much 
higher than for Gaza‟s manufacturing sector. Moreover, before the 
technicians join the company, they usually place a precondition that they 
will work with the company on a temporary basis, until they get their 
permits to work inside Israel.‟ 
              Shurrab: Interview, 1997 
 
 The finding of the field work showed that 56.7% of the establishments 
complained of shortage of skills
1
 (see Table 3). In addition, 69.1% of the sample 
organisations encountered significant labour force problems (Table 4), this was mainly 
concerned with the high absenteeism rates and a high turnover of labour.  
 One of the reasons for the shortage of skills in Gaza‟s manufacturing sector was 
attributed to the lack of balance between quality and quantity of the territory‟s work 
force. Several studies emphasised the importance of qualitative deficiencies in human 
resources (Bull, 1975), these studies stressed problems caused by the shortage of  
educated, trained and skilled personnel in developing countries all of which are essential 
for industrial development. Given that many of Gaza‟s workers are inadequately 
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prepared educationally, socially, and technically for industry, this situation is not helped 
by the lack of any educational or training development strategy for Gaza‟s work force. 
This shortcoming was attributed to the Israeli occupation policies as well as to the 
Palestinians themselves. Only 4.3% of those people from Gaza who were working in 
Israel were employed in manufacturing, while 75.4% were in construction (SAI 1993), 
another indication of the lack of familiarisation with industrial culture on the part of 
Gaza‟s work force. A few training centres and two universities were established in Gaza 
during the occupation period, (all training centres were controlled by non-Palestinians 
(UNRWA or Israeli authorities, while the universities are controlled by the Palestinians) 
but, there is a consensus among those interviewed (Interviews, 1997), that the 
programmes in the training centres and universities were mainly designed to produce a 
labour force suitable for external employment, mainly in Israel and the Arab Gulf 
countries. For example, the curricula of training centres do not contain any management 
studies, instead they put emphasis on technical subjects. A majority of the trainees of the 
UNRWA training centre in Gaza the researcher spoke to, did not work in their chosen 
fields in Gaza, due to lack of opportunities; at the same time the majority of the trainees 
in the centres run by the Israeli authorities, were able to find employment in their fields 
of specialisation in Israeli establishments (Halabi: Interview, 1997). 
 DATA Studies and Consultations commented on the quality of training and 
education in the occupied territories by saying that:  
„The current extent and level of the industrial education offered, does not 
match required standards. Vocational or on the job training opportunities 
are very limited, thus the number of trained or educated labourers are 
minimal.‟ (1995, p. 8). 
 
Gaza‟s universities have only played a minor role in solving the problem of skill 
shortages. Universities in Gaza, as in all developing countries, need to play a greater 
role in society‟s development. (Jerbawi, 1986). The failure is partly due to the limited 
number of qualified staff and to the Israeli occupation‟s restrictions on research and 
development in Gaza. Halabi, (Interview, 1997) commented on the universities‟ role in 
Gaza by saying that:            
“Universities were isolated from the society, and they were far  
from satisfying the needs of the Palestinian economy”.  
 
Moamer (Interview, 1997) believes that because the universities have only recently been 
established (the Islamic University of Gaza in 1978 and El-Azhar in 1991), it is not fair 
to expect very much from them. It is arguable that local universities have not been 
sensitive to the requirements of the manufacturing sector; the present curricula of the 
universities are a mixture of Arab and western influences without taking into 
consideration the requirements of the society. They have not addressed, or been able to 
address, the need to produce qualified personnel with the necessary skills needed by the 
local industries or the management in the public sector. It was noticed by the authors 
that  the institutions‟ text books were mostly old, and were changed from term to term 
according to the educational background of the lecturers. For example, (from one of the 
authors own experience), in the 1986 academic year, the text book for the course on 
„production management‟ in the Business School was written in Egypt, in 1970  The 
text highlighted the procedures which should be followed in establishing new projects in 
Egypt under conditions, none of which apply to Gaza. After the Palestinian authority 
was established the universities in Gaza began to play a more positive role in 
manufacturing development (Halabi, 1997; Moamer, 1997; Rayes, 1997; Ashour, 1997). 
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They introduced some rehabilitation and training programmes for the private sector in 
general, acting as a business clinic by providing consultations, free or on reduced costs, 
and providing several workshops. However, in the opinion of those interviewed, the 
universities in Gaza are only playing a marginal rule in research and industrial 
development.  
 The irresponsibility of employees towards industrial development was 
mentioned by some of the industrialists interviewed (1997). The lack of responsibility 
by employees can be attributed to the following:  
 1) Inadequate salaries, it was found that the average annual industrial 
wage in Israel is four-times higher than Gaza‟s. In addition, there are no additional 
benefits, e.g., health insurance, social security, pensions or medical services. Only 29.9 
% of the sample organisations provide some of these services in addition to the 
employees‟ wages (see Table 5);  
2) Gaza‟s employees‟ feel insecure at work,  as a result of the volatile political 
situation and the high unemployment rate which has led to a lack of commitment from 
both  the company and the employees. If a better opportunity arises for the worker he 
most probably leaves without notice;  
 3) Lack of motivation for company employees. This can be attributed to a 
combination of low wages, lack of training programmes, too close supervision, and lack 
of participation in decision making.  
Shurrab (Interview, 1997) rejects the idea of training, arguing that “they are working on 
a temporary basis”. In addition, Moamer (Interview, 1997) said: “in the past training 
was not part of the concern of Palestinian industrialists in Gaza. This was attributed to 
the entrepreneurs‟ attitudes, not to their financial capabilities”. A similar result was 
noticed by the researcher from the interviews conducted with companies‟ 
owners/managers, in April 1994. Some of the interviewees rejected the idea of training 
claiming that they have “enough experience to teach anyone who is in need”. Lack of 
incentives and low employee morale in Gaza‟s manufacturing sector may encourage 
qualified staff to leave the companies, or the companies may fail to attract qualified 
skills. Nevertheless, the shortage of skills has naturally contributed to the lack of 
manufacturing development in Gaza. 
4. Manufacturing Raw Materials 
The main sources of Gaza‟s industrial inputs are external suppliers as a result of the 
limited natural resources in Gaza. When buying raw materials there are several factors 
which need to be considered. They are cost, quality, and quantity. The cost and quality 
of the raw materials are normally considered in terms of value for money. However, the 
practices of Gaza‟s entrepreneurs are different, the majority of Gaza‟s manufacturing 
establishments sacrifice the quality of the industrial inputs in favour of  price (Moamer: 
Interview, 1997). In addition, a number of companies randomly used different types of 
raw materials
2
 (e.g. plastic, painting and metal industries) which have resulted in 
fluctuation in quality of the product (Moamer; Rayes; Abu Assi: Interviews, 1997). The 
lack of quality control has undermined customer satisfaction and confidence in locally 
manufactured products. Added to this is that most entrepreneurs do not communicate 
directly with the external suppliers (who are primarily Israeli), which results in extra 
charges for mediators (Rayes; Moamer; Halabi: Interviews, 1997; UNCTAD, 1993).  
 The maintenance of adequate stock levels was largely ignored throughout 
practically all the companies interviewed with the result that serious interruptions were 
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experienced in manufacturing operations. Badwan (1994) stated that most of Gaza‟s 
manufacturing establishments have enough stock levels to cover only one week of 
operations at the most. He attributed these low stock levels to the shortage of capital by 
Gaza‟s firms.  
 There is a cost to maintaining a high level of stocks, however, it is more 
expensive for a company to stop operation because of lack of industrial inputs. Lack of 
storage facilities, and management policy towards stock levels are considered to be 
additional important factors. Many of Gaza‟s manufacturing establishments repeatedly 
stopped their production activities because of the shortage of raw materials (Badwan, 
1994). This has future consequences not only for a company‟s loss of production, but 
also for fluctuations in production costs and loss of market due to unreliability. 
5. Financial Problems 
Shortage of capital is one of the most serious problems facing the manufacturing 
establishments in Gaza. Besides the external aspects of this problem, there are some 
internal factors. Some firms did not consider the shortage of loan and credit facilities a 
problem, the findings of the field survey revealed that 15.5% of the establishments 
interviewed did not have a shortage of funds (Table 6) and 8.2% did not consider the 
absence of banking services a problem (see Table 7), as they did not wish to expand, 
introduce new products or invest in new technology.  
In addition, 99.62% of the total capital invested in Gaza‟s manufacturing sector 
was financed from personal sources, which are usually limited (Union of Industrialists, 
Gaza, 1993). This phenomenon may be attributed to the attitudes of Gaza‟s industrialists 
in their refusal to form partnerships with other investors, in order to keep the company 
under their personal control. Most joint ventures in Gaza fail to survive because those 
involved find it difficult to work as a team. Abu Assi emphasised that “teamwork 
between partners and managers is lacking” (Interview, 1997). This problem was also 
emphasised by the owner of  a plastics factory (Interview, 1997) who stressed the 
serious need for extra capital to replace the low quality of machinery, but he refused the 
idea of taking partners or loans, because, as he put it, “This would be a burden on the 
business”. This attitude and lack of business understanding is probably one of the main 
reasons why over 99 % of Gaza‟s industrial capital comes from personal and family 
sources. Meanwhile, the majority of the companies continue to complain of shortage of 
investment capital. There is a general lack of understanding of the concept of a company 
in Gaza (Rayes: interview, 1997). This is readily seen in the lack of separation between 
the companies‟ and managers/owners‟ assets. For example, the majority of owners 
withdraw from the company account more than the agreed or calculated limit, bringing 
the company into liquidity problems in some instances (Rayes; Halabi: Interviews, 
1997). 
In all probability the main objective of a private business, is the maximisation of 
profit
3. However, in Gaza according to Ismail (Interview, 1997): “The important thing 
for most of the business owners was being self-employed, profit maximisation was 
rarely considered, survival was the top priority.” Consequently profit margin was limited 
which reflected negatively on the size of industrial establishments. 
 Capital budgeting is another concept not properly understood by Gaza‟s 
industrialists. Typically, every establishment has a certain amount of capital available 
for investment. Budgets are necessary to distribute funds in appropriate manner, and to 
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objective is to achieve a satisfactory return on investment. 
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monitor their efficient use (Hunter, 1983). However, in Gaza, capital budgeting is hardly 
ever used (Ismail; Rayes; Halabi: Interviews, 1997). 
6. Machinery and Equipment 
 The quality of machinery and equipment also plays an important role in a 
company‟s viability. DRC (1997, p2), described the technology used in the 
manufacturing industry in Palestine as „informal‟ technology. Informal, because the 
technology used was not selected on the basis of objective factors such as the cost of 
machinery, running costs, machinery life cycle, market absorptive capacity and 
availability of skills,  (DRC, 1997). Instead the technology was chosen on an 
opportunistic basis largely based on their relationship with Israeli companies and the 
price of the machinery. For example, Shurrab (the founder and manager of a plastics 
factory in Khan Younis) said  “I chose this machinery because it is cheaper than the 
other options, though I know the machinery is of low quality with a short life span”. 
This also results in low productivity, poor quality and high production costs in 
manufacturing
4
. All experts interviewed mentioned that, the great majority of the 
machinery used in Gaza‟s industrial establishments is second hand mainly from Israel. 
Rayes and Halabi, who conducted a survey on all plastic industries in Gaza, pointed out 
(Interviews, 1997) that about 97% of the machinery used in Gaza‟s plastics sub-sector is 
old, some of which had been in operation since 1950. This type of technology naturally 
imposes constraints on the quality and type of products. It has undermined the ability of 
Gaza‟s industries to compete with foreign goods either in the local5 or foreign markets. 
Admittedly, the cost of new machinery may be prohibitive for the majority of small 
businesses given the lack of financial borrowing facilities and poor banking and 
financial advice. 
7. Maintenance 
 It was reported by Policy Research Incorporated (1992) that industrial 
maintenance was a serious problem in Palestinian territories. Several aspects of the 
maintenance problem in the West Bank were cited as follows (1992, pp. 27-28): 
1)  during start-up phases of development of specific industries, human 
resource needs are rarely studied and usually underestimated;  
2)  maintenance requirements are not assessed until the first instance of 
equipment break-down, personnel are not aware of correct maintenance 
procedures, and managers often prefer to wait until equipment failure, rather than 
stopping production for regular maintenance;  
3)  company owners/managers often do not ensure that new (or second-
hand) equipment has the requisite technical manuals and service contracts, nor 
do they arrange for training of technicians in equipment maintenance and repair;   
4) on-site repair and maintenance capability is poor and managers 
hesitate to call on outside technical expertise for equipment repair. 
 Similar results were reached during the interviews conducted in Gaza‟s 
manufacturing establishments (1997). For example, Moamer said: “The concept of 
regular maintenance rarely exists”. Also, Halabi, Rayes and Ismail (Interviews, 1997) 
pointed out the deficiencies in maintenance procedures in Gaza‟s manufacturing 
establishments, stating that managers often wait until equipment break-down rather than 
conducting preventive maintenance in free times to avoid blockage to production. Rayes 
mentioned that the printing sub-sector in Gaza does not have a single local technician to 
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see sections, g and h, below. 
5
 Local or domestic market when used in this article refers solely to the Gaza Strip. 
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maintain the machinery. This is a further indication of the lack of experience of the 
basic tenants of industrialisation. 
8. Production and Product Quality 
 Production is viewed in the Gaza Strip as the most important business function. 
The industrial management in Gaza tend to define „capacity‟ as „production capacity‟ 
rather than in terms of marketing, which includes the capacity of  the market to absorb 
the products. In addition, when management performance is judged by output, quality is 
often sacrificed. When warehouses are full, goods are haphazardly stored in open spaces 
throughout the plant location fully exposed to the weather. Random visits to factories in 
Gaza confirmed this situation. 
 Gaza contains some developed industries which include clothing, plastics and 
some food products. However, these industries have limited experience in designing and 
finishing. Ismail (Interview, 1997) commented: “Gaza‟s industrialists only came to 
know Total Quality Management (TQM) in 1995”. The concept of TQM, of course, 
touches every aspect of the organisation including the quality of materials purchased 
from suppliers, the approach to control on production line, the appearance of the 
building, the way the problems are solved for customers, the way employees are 
organised and the establishment‟s internal communication system (Hannagan, 1995). It 
should be noted that there is no single or simple process to measure quality, however, 
there are indicators which can be used to judge how well a quality management system 
has worked. These indications include profit growth, market share and the return on 
capital invested. For example, Gaza‟s manufacturing revenue declined in 1992 by 30% 
from its 1987 level (SAI, 1988; 1993). This decline in manufacturing revenue is partly 
the result of poor quality. 
 Sunoqrot is a leading biscuit manufacturing company in the West Bank which 
has implemented the TQM concept. The company succeeded in achieving the quality 
standard, ISO 9000 in June 1997, while in Gaza until June 1997, none of its 
establishments were granted this certificate (Ismail: Interview, 1997). However, 
Moamer and Abu Assi (Interviews, 1997) believe that Gaza‟s industrialists have the 
necessary skills to produce high quality products, but have no intention to doing so. 
They produce low quality products by using cheap raw materials, sacrificing quality for 
price. Palestinian industrialists have acknowledged that the quality of their products falls 
below that of Israeli products, but their response has been to look for a different market 
segment in Gaza rather than compete with Israeli products (Ismail: Interview, 1997). 
Such practices have created local customer hostility to products produced in Gaza and 
contributed to intensifying the competition among local industries.  In addition, such 
production practices in Gaza make it difficult for the PNA to implement a mixed 
„import substituting and export oriented‟ strategy as recommended by Sayigh, (1993).  
Most products are of poor quality compared with the equivalent product produced in 
Israel. Ismail (1997) described one of the food establishments he visited as being 
“similar to a mechanics workshop”. Similar observations were noticed by one of the 
authors of this article during his visits to 97 manufacturing sites. In short there is a lack 
of industrial sophistication.  
 Halabi (Interview, 1997) pointed out that in his view, the lack of industrial 
experience in Gaza was reinforced by his experience at an industrial exhibition in Dubai 
in early 1997, in which 17 industrial firms from Gaza participated. Halabi mentioned 
three significant elements: 1) Gaza‟s industrialists were not familiar with international 
standards. This was noticed in clothing products, e.g., the products did not carry labels 
to explain the type of cloth or washing temperature; 2) the industrialists did not know 
the language of their own industry. For example, when they were asked how many 
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minutes does the shirt cost
6
 they failed to understand the question; and 3) the 
productivity of Gaza‟s clothing factories was one third that of its counterpart in Dubai. 
The low productivity can also be attributed to the layout in Gaza‟s factories, the level of 
technical skill of the employees, the establishment of rules in the work place, the lack of 
ability to work as a team, and the absence of productivity standards. The fluctuation in 
Gaza‟s product quality was also attributed to the absence of quality standards and the 
lack of control by the Israeli administration. 
 There is no evidence of inventiveness in Gaza‟s industries. The majority of 
manufacturing products were imitations, largely of Israeli products. There is no evidence 
of planning or research to introduce new products. Moamer (Interview, 1997): “The 
concept of new product development based on experiments and research in Gaza‟s 
manufacturing sector does not exist at all”. This view is supported by some other 
interviewees (Sarraj, 1996; Rayes, 1997; Najjar, 1996; Ismail, 1997 and Ashour, 1997). 
9. Marketing 
 If we take the concept of marketing as: “achieving organisational goals based on 
determining the needs and wants of target markets and delivering the desired 
satisfactions more effectively and efficiently than competitors” (Kotler and Armstrong, 
1990, p.13), then the focus is on consumer needs, and emphasises the importance of 
customer satisfaction, whereas a selling concept would place the emphasis on the 
company‟s existing products, and would call for heavy selling efforts to obtain 
profitable sales (Kotler and Armstrong, 1990). 
 Field work and other evidence strongly suggest that marketing is a neglected 
function of the manufacturing establishments in the Gaza Strip, simply because there is 
a distinct lack of understanding of the concept of marketing. To many people, marketing 
is little more than selling. As a result, management tend to focus their efforts on 
products, with very little or no consideration to customer needs in the market place. 
Accustomed as the population are to chronic shortages of goods, management often 
believes that once produced, goods sell themselves (Rayes; Halabi; Moamer: Interviews, 
1997). Simply put, it is widely believed that there is no need for marketing. For 
example, Shurrab (Interview, 1997), though he complained of fierce competition did not 
consider marketing as a force in the competition for customers. His comment was: “We 
do not advertise, we know the market and the customers, and therefore there will not be 
a positive advantage in any promotion campaign”. After the establishment of the 
Palestinian Authority in Gaza, interviewees commented that they noticed a change in 
attitude towards marketing practices. This may be attributed to the increase in 
competition in Gaza and to the return of some experienced Palestinian entrepreneurs 
from the Diaspora, but it has yet to become established practice. A few companies did 
use advertising on social and religious occasions and at seminars, by distributing free 
samples to the attendees. Personal selling is the least popular promotion technique used. 
The tradition is that the buyer always initiates and contacts the supplier. For that reason 
alone, very little emphasis was put on the selection and training of salesmen (Rayes; 
Ismail; Moamer: Interviews, 1997; Badwan: Interview, 1996). Ninety five per cent or 
more of Gaza‟s manufacturing establishments do not have marketing managers 
(Moamer; Farra: Interviews, 1997) nor do they have marketing research departments, 
which reflects their neglect of customer orientation.. Abu Assi (Interview, 1997) 
believes that there is no customer care, and he added, “If the customer buys any product 
he must accept the product he buys as it is”. An example was given by Abu Assi.  He 
                                                 
6
 It means how many minutes it takes to produce a certain product from collecting the material from the 
warehouse to the final stage of production. 
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bought a new domestic water pump, under warrantee for a year. However, the pump 
stopped working after two months. When he went to the seller he refused to replace the 
unit or even repair it without payment. Abu Assi said: “I just left the pump in the shop 
and walked away”. “Marketing skills are well below what are needed in the West Bank 
and Gaza” (Hazboun et al, 1995, p. 39).  
 As one would expect the same attitudes apply to the international markets. 98% 
of Gaza‟s exports go to Israel and only 2% to other external markets, (SAI, 1993). The 
failure to sell overseas spells disaster for the balance of trade and payments in the Gaza 
Strip. The presence of local training in marketing could help to expand the awareness of 
the power of marketing in developing the potential of locally produced commodities, 
and making exports possible for small businesses with limited resources (DATA Studies 
and Consultations, 1995). 
 The weakness of the competitive position of Gaza‟s manufacturing firms is also 
attributed to the attitudes of the local distributors and retailers towards the local 
products. An industrialist from the West Bank said: “The local traders in the occupied 
territories prefer to promote foreign goods because of their higher profit margins 
compared to the domestic products” (Alraed, 1993). Similarly, Rayes (Interview, 1997) 
considered this issue as crucial and added: “One of the factors attributed to the strength 
of Israeli products in Gaza‟s market is the publicity and wide experience of local 
distributors and dealers of Israeli goods who refuse to deal with domestic products”. 
Further, Rajab (1997) highlighted this problem claiming that the local merchants prefer 
foreign products to the local ones, because they assume that foreign products are more 
reliable and trustworthy than the local products. 
 Managers require information regarding current and potential customers, 
competitors and market growth forecasts which need to be available in an accurate and 
timely fashion (Al-Shamali and Wild 1995) . More important, however, is the fact that 
managers need to understand how to interpret this information and utilise it in the most 
effective manner. Information on the Gaza market is lacking. While limited data exists 
on annual industrial sales figures, much could be done in the way of determining who is 
buying the goods. Furthermore, while Gaza possesses broad figures on its population, 
there is very poor detailed demographic and socio-economic information. Consequently, 
most firms are taking a rather haphazard approach to the market, in their competitive 
positions and strategy formulation (Moamer; Rayes; Halabi: Interviews, 1997). 
 Local establishments need to learn how to obtain more information concerning 
consumers. The management of Gaza‟s industrial establishments also need to learn to 
appreciate the value of this information, how it can be obtained and how to employ it 
more effectively than their competitors. For example, firms selling to organisations 
should maintain databases on their active and inactive accounts. Firms in consumer 
goods markets would be well advised to develop a socio-economic profile of their 
customer base, including such details as age, gender, marital status, family size, 
approximate income, education, where they live, and more complex data such as 
lifestyle, personality and reasons for purchase. In this way firms can focus on or appeal 
to a particular segment of the population and attempt to acquire their loyalty, (provided 
they also improve the quality of their products). All the interviewees (1997) agreed that 
Gaza‟s manufacturing establishments have fragmented information on the local and 
external markets. They do not follow the product in order to get feedback from the 
customer on how successful the product is in achieving customer satisfaction. Nor do 
they maintain a database on the markets and prices. In fact, “the majority of market 
research conducted on behalf of Gaza‟s establishments is inaccurate and mostly 
unrealistic” (Ismail: Interview, 1997). The results of the field work conducted by Nofal 
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(1997) disclosed that 77.3% of the sample organisations do not have information on the 
international markets. 
 Many products offered to the market have to be packaged. Packaging includes 
all the activities of designing, labelling and producing the container or wrapper for the 
product. In the past, the function of packaging was simply to contain and protect the 
product . However, packaging and labelling have become important marketing tools 
(Kotler and Armstrong, 1990). Because of the increase in self-service outlets, packaging 
is now performing many marketing tasks.  Companies have realised the power of good 
packaging to create instant consumer recognition of the company or brand. Poor 
packaging and labelling are additional problems which have contributed to the failure of 
Gaza‟s manufacturing industries to develop beyond its traditional boundaries. These 
problems were mentioned by all interviewees (1996, 1997). Obviously this problem is 
attributed to the lack of information on the markets and customers and to the lack of 
awareness of the advantages of good packaging and labelling. 
10. Managerial Practices in the Gaza Strip 
 In the management literature, there are numerous discussions of the ways in 
which managers are typically affected by their cultural and social backgrounds, as well 
as by behavioural and economic factors. The family structure and the relationship 
between family members, the degree of acceptance of authority in the society, economic 
conditions, the overall standard of living, and personal and behavioural characteristics 
of managers all contribute to differences in their managerial styles in different nations 
(Yucelt, 1985). Despite this proposition about the factors which affect management 
styles in general, the findings of the field work of this study suggest that Gaza‟s 
manufacturing establishments pay very little attention to management principles and 
practices. 
 Before analysing the managerial style in Gaza‟s manufacturing establishments 
some of the literature highlighting the family influence on business will be discussed. 
This issue is essential because the majority of Gaza‟s manufacturing establishments are 
family owned and controlled. The field work in this study suggested that 98 per cent of 
the sample organisations are managed by the owner or a member of the family. There 
are some positive and negative aspects for organisations being family owned and 
managed. Some of these aspects are as follows (Hazboun et al, 1995):  
1.  Positive aspects of family businesses  
There are two main positive features: a) Interpersonal benefits, such as 
trust, kinship and the family network which helps to moderate business stress 
and hardship and facilitate the exchange of ideas and views; b) continuity 
benefits, which include protection of trade secrets and other intellectual property, 
wealth transfer between generations, skill refinement through experience and 
easier long-term planning. 
2.  Negative aspects of family businesses  
There are two main negative aspects of family influence on business 
which are: a) Internal concentration of a family on itself may result in slower 
adaptation to the business environment, a slower professionalisation of the firm, 
and slow capital growth because of the reliance on family funding; b) defender 
strategic orientation, (or risk averse), which leads to smaller-scale operations that 
are easier to control.  
It seems that the negative side of family influence on Gaza‟s businesses far 
outweighs the positive elements when it comes to manufacturing development. The 
internal concentration of Gaza‟s family businesses on themselves contributed to the 
often limited financial resources, shortage of skills, the sector‟s domination by 
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traditional products and poor product quality. For example, the field work of the study 
suggested that 79.4% of the establishments are run by managers with qualifications at 
secondary level or less (see Table 8).  
A number of studies on small business management maintain that if the 
entrepreneur continues to lead the project beyond the start-up phase, then the 
organisational performance of the project will suffer, and the solution to this is the 
replacement of the entrepreneur with a qualified team of managers (see for example, 
Jones-Evans, 1996). On the other hand the situation may be dominated by organisations 
headed by managers with a high degree of technical expertise but with low management 
experience (Jones-Evans, 1996). For example, it was found that the successful 
manufacturing establishments in Gaza are those which are managed by entrepreneurs 
and businessmen (Rayes; Halabi: Interviews, 1997). It was also found in an empirical 
research study that founders of the establishments with scientific or engineering 
backgrounds remain in control of the organisations they founded for shorter periods than 
do founders with academic backgrounds in business (Jones-Evans, 1996). 
Owner/managers with comparatively little expertise in management may consider 
growth and expansion beyond their capabilities (Jones-Evans, 1996). Moreover, the 
finding of the Advisory Council on Science and Technology depicts owners and 
managers as the primary source of inadequate levels of skills and technology (Scott, et 
al, 1996). 
 Before discussing the management styles prevailing among Gaza‟s 
manufacturing sector, two significant cultural issues need to be highlighted, namely the 
low value attached to time, and the thorny issue of envy. 
 a. The Low Value of Time 
 Abuznaid (1995) in his research on socio-cultural pressures on West Bank 
managers classifies the low value given to time in the West Bank as a constraint which 
is largely outside management control. Admittedly, when wages are low time matters 
less than in high wage situations, but even so, according to Abuznaid (1995), 51.5% of 
the managers interviewed in the West Bank complained about the lack of concern for 
time. Abuznaid attributed the lack of exactness and punctuality to the Arab culture as 
well as the Israeli practice of stranding travellers at the military checkpoints, and the 
imposition of curfews and general strikes, although these practices imposed by Israel 
were limited to the period of the Intifada (1987-1993). Abuznaid said “The traditional 
Arab believes that he only receives what God has allocated and promised him, no matter 
how hard he works to attain his goals” (1995, p. 46). However, it has been mentioned in 
several parts in the Qura‟an and Sunnah that the best among you is he who works hard 
and fulfils his promise otherwise he will be classified as a hypocrite.  
 All managers and experts interviewed in this research mentioned that none of the 
industrial organisations have written rules or policies to define when workers should 
start and finish, and they have no written job descriptions to define the responsibilities 
and authorities of each position. For example, companies sometimes request workers to 
work unpaid overtime. In return, management does not insist on strict time keeping even 
though it would like to (Ashour: Interview, 1997). In addition, before the outbreak of the 
Intifada, Palestinian workers inside Israel (where time is considered important), proved 
to be well disciplined and highly productive (Roy, 1986; 1987).  
 b. Envy (Evil Eye) 
 Envy is widespread among the Arabs and Moslems. It is described as:  
“a mysterious and hateful power carried by the glance of  a certain person”  
„The evil eye implies that things or persons one holds dear are 
continually vulnerable to damage or destruction caused by other people‟s 
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envy projected through their eyes. The possessor of an evil eye usually 
has no control over his unconscious wishes and their working.‟ 
(Abuznaid, 1995, p. 47) 
 
The problem of envy was mentioned by 7.9% of the West Bank managers (Abuznaid, 
1995). In the Gaza Strip, the interviews with some managers in the manufacturing 
establishments revealed a widespread belief in the harmful effects of envy among them. 
For instance, a manager of the plastic factory rejected the idea of displaying 
advertisements because he was afraid of evil eyes. In addition, there is a widely held 
belief among experts interviewed (1997) that jealousy among Gazans of successful 
industrial projects is the most destructive factor in Gaza. Rayes (Interview, 1997) said: 
“People fight local successful projects with all available means to destroy them”. There 
is a need to convince people of the importance of supporting national industries for the 
benefit of the entire society. Socially Gazans need to understand the destructive nature 
of jealousy, envy and superstition, both to themselves and to society at large. 
10.1 Likert’s Model of Management Styles 
According to Likert (1996) (Cited in Yucelt, 1985) management styles can be classified 
into four systems models and seven factors that determine their style which include: 
leadership, motivation, communication, interaction, decision making, goal setting, and 
control.  
The four systems are:  
A. Authoritative/exploitative;  
B. Benevolent-exploitative;  
C. Consultative;  
D. Participatory.  
 In System A managers tend not to have any confidence or trust in subordinates. 
Managers hold all the authority and subordinates do not participate in decision making. 
There is very little upward communication, and subordinates experience fear, 
punishment, distrust, and occasional rewards. System B managers have some confidence 
and trust in their subordinates, however, subordinates are still not free to discuss job-
related matters with their managers, and there is only minimal upward communication 
and interaction with supervisors. Orders are issued to instruct and to comment on issues 
related to the job. In system C managers have complete confidence and trust in 
subordinates. In this style of management, subordinates feel free to discuss job-related 
problems with their superiors, and experience both rewards and punishment. 
Communication is in both directions (upward and downward) and subordinates 
participate in decision-making without fear. Finally, System D is the most democratic, 
allowing subordinates to discuss and interact in job-related matters with complete 
confidence and trust in their superiors. Subordinates are more likely to be highly 
motivated to achieve organisational goals and fully participate in decision-making. In 
addition, there is always a free and easy flow of communication from one part of the 
organisation to another.  
According to the Likert model (1976) (Cited in Yucelt, 1985), any establishment 
may be characterised by one of these systems. The application of the Likert system 
theory illustrates that developed nations tend to adopt a more participatory style, while 
in developing nations, management style tends to be more authoritative (Yucelt, 1985). 
Morale and productivity tends to increase as an organisation moves from System A to 
System D (Yucelt, 1985). For example, a study in Yugoslav establishments suggested 
that the more successful organisations apply System C style, and the less successful ones 
apply the System B style of management. 
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10.2 Exploring Management Style Using Likert’s Model 
 In order to examine the management styles in Gaza‟s manufacturing 
establishments by using Likert‟s system, interviews were conducted with 11 managers 
in establishments employing eleven or more. The researchers used open-ended questions 
which gave the interviewees the opportunity to approach the different topics in their 
preferred way. 
 The application of Likert‟s system theory demonstrated that Gaza tends more 
towards A and B (authoritarian), and we draw attention to three issues arising from the 
interviews: leadership, decision making and planning. 
10.2.1  Leadership 
 As just mentioned, Gaza‟s managers leaned more towards an authoritarian style 
of leadership. There is almost no delegation of power to subordinates. Managers tended 
not to listen to the opinions of others, saying that they themselves are “the most 
understanding and aware of management techniques” (Rayes; Halabi; Ismail: 
Interviews, 1997). Although the great majority of industrial establishments employ 
relatives and friends, managers have little confidence or trust in their subordinates, as a 
result close supervision was maintained (Elhayek; Ismail; Ashour: Interviews, 1997). In 
addition, some of Gaza‟s managers believe that it is risky to employ and train somebody 
from outside the family. Because they may decamp to another company or establish 
their own businesses, it was remarked by many of those interviewed that duplication of 
businesses was alarming, (Rayes: Interview, 1997). Managers in this world tend not to 
perform as a team members. 
10.2.2 Decision Making 
 Following from the previous section, as a result of authoritarian leadership, 
decisions are always made at the top with no consultation with subordinates. Moamer 
and Abu Assi (1997) stressed that joint ventures in Gaza have failed because of the 
authoritarian style in management. Gaza‟s managers are more involved in day-to-day 
operational and tactical decisions because of  the lack of delegation of authority. They 
make incremental decisions which gives them less time to focus on the strategic issues. 
All interviewed experts (1997) mentioned the lack of specialisation at work, lack of 
division between ownership and management, and between management and production 
as part of the constraints which contributed to the lack of manufacturing development in 
Gaza. For example, Halabi (Interview, 1997) reported one of the incidents he 
experienced at the industrial exhibition in Dubai in 1997, where 17 manufacturing 
establishments from Gaza were represented. A manager/owner of a manufacturing firm 
from Gaza was negotiating to sell some goods worth about $80,000 (with a good level 
of profit), to a businessman in Dubai. During the negotiation, the Gaza businessman 
went off to sell to another customer an item worth about $15. Halabi believes that the 
disruption of the negotiation was one of the main reasons which made the potential 
($80,000) buyer withdraw from the deal. Not surprisingly, Halabi (Interview, 1997) 
described the decision making method in Gaza‟s manufacturing sector as “very strange”. 
“If the entrepreneur received advice from an expert concerning a certain problem which 
may not match with his opinion, he would reject the advice and refuse to listen” (Halabi: 
Interview, 1997). He cited an example of the owner of greenhouses in Gaza who sought 
his advice before the establishment of a factory (where the project cost was estimated to 
be $3 million), to produce greenhouses. Halabi said “I advised him that Gaza‟s market 
was too small to absorb the production of the factory, and I advised him to search for 
new markets before establishing the business. Unfortunately this businessman did not 
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listen and the project was established but folded after 3 months of operation because of 
market limitation”.  
Gaza‟s executives appear to have fragmentary and weak information about the 
companies they manage, the existing markets, potential markets and customers.  By 
contrast, managers in the USA, for example, have strong and balanced information 
bases for their decisions (El-Ansari, 1985). On the macro level, Gaza‟s main sources of 
data are based on Israeli statistics, which are unreliable and misleading (Benvenisti, 
1987). Moreover, the supremacy of the individual owner/manager over the system in 
Gaza renders management decision-making, emotional and personal. “The weak and 
spotty information bases for decision-making increases reliance on personal trust and 
contacts in getting positive decisions, thus increasing the personal and emotional 
components of the process” (El-Ansari, 1985, p. 51). 
 Table 9, shows some of the differences in management practices between Gaza 
and the United States. However, someone could say that the use of American 
management practices in Gaza‟s manufacturing establishments are unsuitable and that 
managers in Gaza do as much as they can to achieve the best results under difficult 
circumstances. Nevertheless, the findings of the field work and the analysis of the 
available statistics on Gaza‟s industry have revealed how Gaza‟s manufacturing sector 
remains undeveloped.  
 In addition, it was found that the only successful establishments (which are few) 
are those run by entrepreneurs and qualified managers. (Rayes; Halabi: Interviews, 
1997). 
10.2.3 Planning 
 All companies need to look ahead and develop long-term strategies to meet the 
changing conditions in their surrounding environments (Kotler and Armstrong, 1990). 
Experts insist that, “Sound planning helps the company to anticipate and respond 
quickly to environmental changes and to be better placed for sudden developments” 
(Kotler and Armstrong, 1990, p. 27).  Most of Gaza‟s companies never plan at all, and if 
they do the plans are neither followed nor carried out within the established time frames 
(Ashuor; Rayes; Moamer; Ismail; Halabi: Interviews, 1997). Plans are usually short-
term, and none of Gaza‟s establishments prepare long-term plans.  In addition, plans are 
overly ambitious, unrealistic, and in most cases prepared by unqualified persons who do 
not know much about the reality of the marketplace (Ashuor; Rayes; Moamer; Ismail; 
Halabi: Interviews, 1997). Furthermore, project planning is based on production figures 
characterised as production-oriented. Even when project planning or feasibility studies 
are underway, Gaza‟s industrialists still seem preoccupied with production planning. By 
contrast in the developed world the practice is to conduct feasibility studies and 
understand the markets prior to any discussion of production planning (El-Ansary, 
1985). Indeed, the fieldwork and the analysis of the literature on Gaza‟s manufacturing 
establishments demonstrated a consensus among ministerial officials and industrialists 
that market limitations both self imposed, as well as political, are one of the main 
constraints which undermined industrialisation in Gaza. The concept of market share 
and the introduction of new products are the most neglected areas in Gaza. 
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11. Conclusion 
 This paper set out to examine the internal constraints facing Gaza‟s 
manufacturing sector during the Israeli occupation. It reveals that the lack of 
manufacturing development is not only the result of external factors largely the result of 
the occupation but is also the result of local business attitudes and lack of experience in 
management and industrial techniques. 
 When examining business locations, the size of buildings and their facilities, the 
majority were rarely suitable for their present, let alone their future, needs. Only a few of 
Gaza‟s manufacturing establishments had chosen locations based on closeness to their 
market or the supply of skilled labour. The great majority had never conducted 
feasibility studies and in those instances where such studies had been carried out they 
were either inaccurate or never carefully implemented. This was largely attributable to 
the lack of local expertise and to the business owners themselves who were seeking 
cheap short term solutions. 
 With regard to the shortage of skilled labour in Gaza‟s manufacturing firms the 
study revealed that part of the problem was attributable to the lack of appropriate 
education and training for the needs of Gaza‟s industry. Instead the training was 
designed to prepare a labour force for external employment, principally in Israel. 
The majority of manufacturing establishments rely on imported raw materials and price 
was the most important criterion in their purchase. Price again was the most important 
criteria when purchasing machinery; running costs, maintenance, skilled labour for the 
machinery and market capacity for the products were largely ignored. 
 An indication of the poor quality of Gaza‟s products is that none of Gaza‟s 
establishments is qualified to get the international quality standard ISO 9000. 
 There is widespread misunderstanding of the concept of „marketing‟ which to 
most firms was synonymous with „selling‟, and this together with other shortcomings in 
the understanding of good management practice have all contributed to lack of industrial 
development. The concentration on family and friends in ownership and recruitment can 
be seen in the authoritarian management style adopted by many companies. Although 
many firms experienced a shortage of capital they are averse to accepting loans or 
forming partnerships outside the family. There was often a lack of separation between 
the owner‟s assets and those of the firm which often led to liquidity problems for the 
firms. 
 Not all small businesses want to grow into medium or large enterprises, but they 
are likely to want to at least survive, and hopefully make more money. Those who do 
want to grow need help, and given that the country needs to nurture the growth of local 
businesses, the contribution which government can make to the industrial scene is by 
investing in education and training, providing more financial help and advice, in 
addition to their aim of providing a stable political future. Obviously the infrastructure 
needs to be in place but on a personal level, education, training, guidance and 
information, which will allow people and businesses to better understand their role in 
the wider industrial picture is needed. Creating an awareness is often the first step, when 
people are helped to see how they can better provide for their families, by developing 
their skills, and at the same time contribute to the country‟s industrial development. 
 The lack of development in the area speaks for itself, the constraints, both 
external and internal are largely understood although they are not always documented, 
but it is as well to remind ourselves that the greatest economic force is human 
enterprise, and for that force to develop requires vision and commitment to the vision by 
both the general population and those in authority. When people are nervous and lose 
faith in themselves they often turn towards organised power to take away their burden, 
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protect them, give help, guidance and leadership. Because of the power invested in 
authority there is an enormous responsibility for those in office to use their positions 
wisely. 
 The issues discussed above are only one aspect of a much wider survey, one 
which has naturally included a look at the external constraints facing industrial 
development in Gaza. It is hoped that another article will find its way into a later edition 
of this journal to cover that aspect of the work. 
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Table 1 - Reasons for Manufacturing Establishments’ Locations 
Reasons Number of Firms Per 
cent 
Availability of the Market 6 6.2 
City’s amenities and services 40 41.2 
Availability of the Building 51 52.6 
Total 97 100.0 
 
Table 2 - Manufacturing Establishments who had Conducted a Feasibility Study 
Feasibility Study Number of Firms Per cent 
Conducted  19 19.6 
Never 78 80.4 
Total 97 100.0 
 
Table 3 - Manufacturing Establishments : Shortage of Skills 
Skills Available Number of Establishments Per cent 
Short of Skills 55 56.7 
No Shortage 42 42.3 
Total 97 100.0 
 
Table 4 - Manufacturing Establishments : Problems Encountered  
in Labour Force 
Problems in Labour Force Number of Firms  Per cent 
Absenteeism 40 41.2 
High Turnover 27 27.8 
None 30 30.9 
Total 97 100.0 
 
Table 5 - Manufacturing Establishments by Benefits Paid to the 
Employees In Addition to their Wages  
(e.g., pension, free health service, paid sick-leave ) 
Benefits Introduced Number of Firms  Per cent 
Yes 29 29.9 
No 68 70.1 
Total 97 100.0 
 
Table 6 - Manufacturing Establishments and the Need for Funds 
 Number of 
Firms 
Per cent 
There is a need for funds 82 84.5 
No Need For Funds 15 15.5 
Total 97 100.0 
  
Table 7 - Manufacturing Establishments Who Considered the Absence 
 of Banking Service a Problem 
 Number of Firms Per cent 
A problem 89 91.8 
Not A problem 8 8.2 
Total 97 100.0 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 - Manufacturing Establishments : Managers  
Level of Education 
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 Number of Firms Per cent 
BA or Master 20 20.6 
Secondary or Technical 38 39.2 
Preparatory 39 40.2 
Total 97 100.0 
 
Table 9. Managerial Practices in The Gaza Strip compared with the United States 
A. Management 
Processes 
Gaza Strip The United States 
1. Planning 
- Objectives 
- Concept 
- Time 
- 
 
Surviving and self-employment 
Production 
A year is Long Range 
 
Profitability, Market share and roductivity 
Strategic (financial and marketing) 
5 to 10 years is Long Range 
2. Organisation 
- Orientation 
- Authority 
- Management 
- Accountability 
- Performance Indicators 
 
The Individual 
Centralised 
Owners 
Informal 
Adherence to Procedures 
 
The System 
Decentralised 
Managers 
Formal 
Results 
3. Decision Making 
- Nature 
- Information Base 
- Psychology 
 
Incremental 
Weak and Spotty 
Emotional and Personal 
 
Strategic 
Strong and Well Balanced 
Rational and Corporate 
4. Communication 
- Direction 
- Frequency 
- Urgency 
- Primary Purpose 
 
Top Down 
Infrequent 
Urgent 
Orders 
 
Multiple 
Frequent 
Routine 
Informs 
B. Business Functions   
1. Production 
- Dominance 
- Orientation 
- Capacity 
 
Company Main focus 
Quantity 
Physical 
 
Lower 
Quality 
Marketing 
2. Marketing 
- Orientation 
- Concept 
- Emphasis 
 
Products 
Buying and selling 
Whole salers and retailers 
 
Customers 
Marketing Mix 
Marketing management 
3. Financing 
- Magnitude 
- Sources 
- Security 
 
Thousands and few Millions 
Limited and Personal 
Unstable, high risk 
 
Billions 
Consortium International 
Feasibility studies, cash flow and return on 
investment 
Source: El-Ansary, 1985; Findings of the Interviews with top experts in manufacturing sectors and 
management in Gaza, 1996; 1997. 
 
 
 
